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Abstract
This paper deals with the ontological analysis of tools used in the design and implementation of information
systems. It makes a break from previous research in this area by pointing to the deep connection between
intentionality and ontology. We argue that information systems should be evaluated against ontologies which
are consistent with the ontological and representational commitments of the theory of intentionality which
informs the design of the sociotechnical systems of which they are a component. In order to make this
argument, we propose that the process of designing a sociotechnical system can be conceived of as the design
of an intentional agent. By describing the two leading theories of intentional agency, it becomes clear that
different theories of intentionality are informed by radically different ontologies. The consequences of this for
information systems evaluation are explored.
Introduction
There has been a tradition of using philosophical ontologies in theoretical studies of tools used in the design and implementation
of information systems. Specifically, Bunge's ontology (Bunge 1977; Bunge 1979) has been adapted and used with a number of
tools ranging from data flow diagram through to case tools (Wand 1989; Wand and Weber 1993; Wand et al. 1995; Wand and
Weber 1995; Wand 1996; Weber 1997). Additionally, Chisholm's ontology (Chisholm 1996) has been used to evaluate specific
data modelling tools (Milton et al. 2000).
The research question implicit in these studies is “how well do information systems represent reality?” and “how well do specific
modelling tools represent reality?”. In both questions  the ontology is taken as a theory against which information systems and
tools can be evaluated and comments made about representational quality. In studying these questions, the philosophical ontology
plays the role of being an external reference point outside information systems that describes ‘what there is’ in reality, and against
which the expressive power of the tools can be measured.
In practice, an information system is part of a larger socio-technical system that is designed to do something. Thus, the information
system can be viewed as a component of an intentional system. We therefore seek to investigate the role of ontology in the design
of intentional systems in order to shed new light on what kind of ontologies should be used to evaluate IS design tools and
systems. Drawing on recent research in a number of disciplinary fields, we suggests that there are at least two main theories with
divergent ontological commitments which inform the design of intentional systems, and which we would expect to influence,
explicitly or implicitly, the design of information systems. Our conclusion is that IS tools should be evaluated against ontologies
that are appropriate to the approach to intentionality embodied in the design of the sociotechnical system of which the information
system is a component.
We begin this paper with a discussion of intentional descriptions and of two popular theories of agency. Following this we
elaborate our reflections upon the design process in information systems. 
Intentional Descriptions, Theories of Agency
We routinely think of our own actions as being directed toward the achievement of goals. This is because our sense of free will
suggests to us that we have sufficient autonomy from the constraints of the physical world to allow us to consciously decide the
future by aiming actions at goals that can be thought of, at least partially, as arbitrary. However, we routinely also use language
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that ascribes intentionality to entities which are not humans or even sentient creatures. These entities could be machines of varying
complexity, organisms that are not generally thought to be conscious, collections of organisms such as swarms, organisations and
societies, or more abstract entities such as programs, management systems and information systems. In such cases the intentional
notion employed is quite different from the intrinsic form of intentionality we use to explain our own actions. That form of
intentionality is strongly associated with thought, conscious decision-making, and responsibility for actions, characteristics we
do not readily associate with non-human entities. 
Yet the concept of intentionality applied to non-human entities need not be viewed as mere anthropomorphism. Rather, it is a
scheme for obtaining a parsimonious, high-level description of the behaviour of these entities (Dennett 1978). If you see a
mechanical robot moving around a room collecting soft drink cans and putting them in a rubbish bin, you are likely to say that
the robot is choosing its actions in pursuit of the goal of clearing the room of junk, even though you also know that its behaviour
is entirely explained by the laws of physics that govern the motion of its mechanisms (for simplicity, assume it is clock-work to
avoid quantum mechanics). This intentional description is the ascription of an observer to explain and parsimoniously describe
its behaviour. It is high-level in the sense that it chunks complex behavioural episodes into “actions” such as searching, walking,
picking up, and so forth.
However, the significance of conceiving complex entities as intentional goes beyond description: it is an essential design tool
when systems and desired system behaviours are sufficiently complex. Intentional descriptions and specifications of system
behaviour suggest possible decompositions of complex systems that make the design process tractable. It is inconceivable that
you could build a can-collecting robot by making use only of the physical principles with which the most fundamental description
of its behaviour is expressed, that is the mechanics of levers and gears. It would be unlikely that you would discover by reasoning
about the behaviour of the robot as a whole, at this level of description, the required configurations of these low level parts.
Progress would be made only by decomposing the task into a set of functional sub-systems with well-defined interfaces that can
be designed separately. It is invariably intentional descriptions that allow this. For instance, for the robot one would specify a
sensing systems, an action selection system and action effecting system, and so forth. For human-designed artefacts and systems
there will most likely be a coincidence between the intentions any observer would attribute to the artefact or system and the
intentions the designer had in mind, but we must admit the possibility that sociotechnical systems might also be used in ways not
intended by the designer.
To design the behaviour of a complex system using an intentional decomposition of the system, you must commit to some theory
about how intentional action is possible, some theory of agency. A theory of agency is a theory about:
• how an agent can obtain data about (sense) the world in which it acts;
• how an agent can represent the world it senses
• how an agent can manipulate this representation to select actions which will allow it to close on its presumed (that is
designed) goal; and
• how actions are effected. 
Recently, a number of authors (Brooks 1986; Agre and Chapman 1987; Suchman 1987; Hendriks-Jansen 1996; Johnston  and
Brennan 1996; Agre 1997; Clancey 1997) from diverse disciplines have argued that there are essentially two radically different
main views on the nature of intentional action. What they have in common, though, is that agent actions are presumed to be
derived from a representation of the agent’s condition in the world of action.
To represent the world of action requires commitment to an ontology – a theory about what is, and can be, in the world. Our
argument is that the fundamental connection between ontology and system design is through this place of ontology in theories
of agency and their role in system design, including information  systems design. It is because of this connection that ontology
is relevant to system design and the evaluation of system design tools. If we did not engage in functional decomposition of
systems informed by theories of agency, and only made use of the lowest-level description of system functioning, the only issue
would be whether the system “worked”. It is precisely because we want to and need to build systems using functional
decompositions based on the agent metaphor that conceives system behaviour as resulting from the manipulation of
representations of the agent’s world, that the power of the tools and methods to express the nature of that world arises.
It is therefore vital to an ontological analysis of system design to make explicit the two leading positions on the design of
intentional agents and draw out the ontological commitments of these two theories of agency. This is done in the following two
sections.
Theoretical Foundations and Research Methods
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Deliberative Theories of Agency
First we consider a theory of agency which might be called the “deliberative” or “information processing” theory. The deliberative
theory assumes an objectivist ontology. The world consists of objects with properties. A particular object is of a given kind
because it displays certain properties characteristic of that class of object, and differs  from other objects of that class by virtue
of its particular values for the properties. Objects stand in certain relations to each other. The world is characterised by a set of
possible states of the world, which are allowable configurations of objects (including the agent) under these relations consistent
with constraints imposed by the “physics” of the world. Two particular world states are the “current” state and the “intended” or
“goal” state. States are changed by actions of the agent chosen in some way to achieve a transformation of the world from the
current to the goal state. The agent’s activity is a trajectory of successive world states.
According to this theory the agent makes use of a representation or model of this world that  is capable of modelling by means
of a system of symbols and relations between symbols, the states of the world. The representation is of a particular kind, which
we call a “symbol/object” representation, in which configurations of symbols, their attributes and relations are isomorphic to
objects, properties and relations within states of the world. 
The agent makes use of this representation in the following way. First data gathered by sensing systems that interact with the
world are used to represent in the symbol system a symbol configuration isomorphic to the current state of the world (including
the agent’s “position” in it). Next, deductive processes consistent with the rules of the symbol system are used to determine a
sequence of formal actions that will transform the model current world state to the model goal state without violating the
constraints on symbol manipulation representing the laws of “physics”. This sequence of formal actions is a “plan” which is
handed to an effecter system that implements it in the real world with the expectation that, by virtue of the isomorphism between
the model world and the real world, its implementation will transform the real world to the intended state. Because the model
world is an approximation of the real one, sensing is incomplete and noisy, and effects are not guaranteed, this cycle of sensing,
instantiation, planning and acting may need to be repeated until the goal state is reached or the goal is changed. 
This agency theory is an elaboration of the metaphor of a thinker who decides how to act in the world by deliberation on a mental
model of the world. It certainly captures one mode of human action. However, because of our habit of assuming that all action
is preceded by thought about action, there is a tendency in many academic disciplines and well as practical situations to assume
that this model captures the essence of all human intentional action, and by extension, to be the obvious basis for the design of
intentional action in other complex systems. It was very literally translated in early attempts to build autonomous mobile robots
(Brooks 1991; Agre 1997), as well as being the basis of the Physical Symbol System Hypothesis of Newell and Simon (Newell
and Simon 1981) on the nature of intelligence and much of the cognitive sciences (Gardner 1985). It is also continually put
forward as a basis of planned organisational action (Johnston and Brennan 1996). However, whenever this theory of agency is
seriously tested (for example by “Shakey” (Raphael 1976), the early Stanford attempt to build an autonomous mobile robot along
these lines) it is found to be computationally intractable and to lead to highly brittle performance even in contrived “worlds”, and
to be almost useless in dynamic, ambient environments. It fails as a basis for the fluid, robust and efficient action characteristic
of routine actions of skilled performers.
Situational Theories of Agency
The limitation of the deliberative theory as a basis for action in dynamic, ambient worlds is the essential infeasibility of the
continual translation, required by the theory, from the world of action to the world model and back again to action (Johnston and
Brennan 1996; Agre 1997). This translation is required because of the way in which the agent’s intentions enter the theory. The
ontology and the representation scheme associated with this theory are objective, that is, independent of any agent’s point of view
and purposes. A focal agent’s intentions and point of view enter the theory only through the agent’s symbolic representation of
the hypothetical intended state. This late binding of intentions to an objective description of the world leads to this noisy and
computationally explosive translation process. The world model is an “aerial” or “transcendental” view of the world of an outside,
disembodied observer (Agre 1995). In practice, the agent has available only an incomplete, situated or skewed “ground” view,
obtained through its own sensors, limited by its position in the world and by its physical embodiment, from which to construct
and update its world model.
In addition the objective world model is incapable of representing non-objective aspects of the world that may have significance
for action selection, such as “the threatening nature of a street corner”.  These observations have suggested to a number of authors
from diverse disciplines (Brooks 1986; Agre and Chapman 1987; Suchman 1987; Brooks 1991; Hendriks-Jansen 1996; Clancey
1997) that progress can be made by basing a theory of agency on sense data obtainable directly from the agent’s situated,
embodied, ground view of the world, and to introduce the agents intentions and point of view early on in the theory at the level
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of the ontology and representation schemes. This is done in “situational” or “interactional” theories of agency (Agre 1997). The
approach has its origins in phenomenological philosophy and psychology. 
In situational theories of agency “situations” are the key concept, taking the place of “world states” in the deliberative approach,
but there are essential differences. Situations are accounts of the world from the agent’s situated and embodied point of view. They
are parsimonious descriptions of the world because they need only include features of the world that are relevant to the agent’s
purposes. They are thus intention-laden from the outset. These features consist of the relations of things, which may be real or
imaginary, to the agent. Actions are selected from a repertoire as more or less direct, rule-like responses to situations. In the course
of action-selection the agent makes use of representations of situations in terms of features, these representations being “indexical”
and “functional” in nature (Agre and Chapman 1987). Indexical representations describe the disposition of things relative to the
agent and functional representations select things according to their relevance for the purposes of  the agent. An example of an
indexical/functional reference is “the-keyboard-on-which-I-am-typing-now”,  compared to the objective reference “keyboard
(serial-number = ”T4391”, position = ”Kitchen 3 Pearson St. Richmond”, time = ”16-46 4/2/01”)”. The former reference is non-
objective in the sense that if I were to move to the computer in my office, it becomes “the-keyboard-on-which-I-am-typing-now”
and any symbol representing it needs to be re-bound.
Can such an ontology / representation / action-selection scheme achieve intentional action? That the answer is “yes” under certain
circumstances has been demonstrated by a series of computational and physical experiments in the domain of computer science
(Agre and Chapman 1987; Chapman 1991) and robotics (Brooks 1986; Mataric 1992). However, we are missing at this stage two
important concepts of the theory, namely, environmental structure and interaction. Just as the agent responds to aspects of its
environment (situations) with certain routine actions, so the situation changes in response to the agent’s actions. This is because
situations are agent-centred views of the world, so each  action alters the agent’s situation. However, how a situation is altered
by an action of the agent is far from arbitrary: it is determined by the structure present in the environment of action. So the
sequence; action -> environmental response -> action -> environmental response – etc., which determines outcomes, can be
viewed as being as much due to the structure of the environment as the set of response rules applied by the agent. If the goal
situation is amongst this chain, then goal attainment is just as much due to structure of the environment as to actions of the agent.
In situational theories of agency it is the structure present in the environment of action, and the possibility of stable interaction
of this structure with the agent’s actions, that makes up for the apparent poverty of the agent’s representational and action selection
schemes when compared with deliberative models. In a sense, environmental structure takes some of the “cognitive burden” of
intentional action in this theory. The designer either tweaks the action-selection rules until this interaction routinely achieves goals,
or provides the agent design with a higher level system which monitors this, and takes such action (possibly by invoking
deliberation) itself. 
Sociotechnical Systems as Intentional Agents
At this point we make the observation that the kind of sociotechnical systems, of which information systems are a part, can
legitimately be viewed as intentional agents since they are complex systems that are designed to pursue goals on an ongoing basis.
Examples of such goals are:  “minimise work-in-progress”, “minimise policy payouts”, “maximise solved call centre incidents”.
Therefore, the design of such systems must be informed, either explicitly or implicitly, by a theory about how intentional
behaviour can be achieved. This view of sociotechnical systems as agents in themselves is novel, but it enables us to examine the
implicit design choices in such systems, and their relation to ontology, by reference to the generic alternative theories of
intentionality reviewed above. 
It is important to remember in the discussion that follows that when we refer to intentional agents we mean the sociotechnical
system as a whole, not individual actors that make up this whole and not the users of such systems. Objections have been raised
in the past to treating such large-scale human systems as having goals (e.g. (Silverman 1970)). We believe that these objections
arise through falsely associating the kind of intrinsic intentionality we attribute to ourselves with the intentionality of systems.
If we stick to the weaker form of intentionality as a descriptive and design-oriented ascription of an observer / designer (Dennett
1978) such objections vanish.
We now pursue this notion to show that there is a deep link between ontologies that are relevant to information systems and the
choice of intentional notions that inform the system design.
Theoretical Foundations and Research Methods
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Implications for Ontological Evaluation of Information Systems
Intentional agent designs must include sensing systems, representational schemes, action selection systems and action execution
systems. Comparing the socio-technical system of which an information system is a part with this specification, it is natural to
identify the information system with the representational scheme of the overall sociotechnical agent. (It could be implicated in
action selection also, but the recommending of action by information systems has fallen out of favour in recent times). As noted
above the type of representational scheme that is appropriate to an agent design depends on the ontology at the heart of the theory
of agency which informs the design, and can be expected to be based on different representational principles when the
sociotechnical system of which it is part is informed, by one or other of the major theories of agency.
In particular, if the system were designed in accord with the deliberative theory of agency described above we would expect that
the principles and tools used to build the information systems would need to be  capable of expressing the elements of the type
of objectivist ontology employed in this theory. So evaluating such tools against the best example of such an ontology would be
likely to indicate how successfully they might be used to implement such a deliberative agent design. Similarly if the system were
designed with the situational model of agency in mind it would be inappropriate to evaluate it against such an objectivist ontology.
The situational view of agency treats the world as made up of indexical and functional relations between the focal agent and real
or imaginary entities in the world. An appropriate ontology against which to measure such systems would have to include such
categories. The point here is that it is not the designer’s or the evaluator’s own ontological assumptions about what makes up the
world that they experience that counts: it is the notions about  the categories of entities which need to be represented according
to the chosen agent design metaphor that counts, or put more colourfully, it is what makes up the world that the agent experiences
that counts. Thus, there is an argument for considering theories of intentionality when choosing benchmark ontologies for
information system evaluation.
However, there is another sense in which theories of intentionality are important. If judging the expressive power of information
systems tools against ontologies is to be a predictor of the effectiveness of the resulting systems, which has been one motive for
this kind of work, then not only does the ontology have to be appropriate for the intentional design commitments of the system
of which it is part as discussed above, but also the intentional design commitments of the system have to be appropriate for the
problem domain to which the system is to be applied. This argument suggest that tools and modelling methodologies which are
judged ontologically sound against a certain ontology might be used to build systems that are ineffective because the theory of
intentionality to which the ontology is appropriate is not a good basis for a robust, efficient sociotechnical system design. This
could represent a predictive limitation for the traditional approach outlined in the introduction. It is of course an open question
as to which of the two theories of intentionality forms the best basis for design in which problem domains. However, there is
mounting evidence from research in human-machine interaction studies (Suchman 1987), artificial intelligence (Chapman 1991;
Agre 1997; Clancey 1997), robotics (Brooks 1991) and management theory (Johnston 1995), that the deliberative theory, although
intuitively appealing, forms a poor design basis for intentional agents designed to act in complex, changing environments and
unstructured problem domains, and that the situational theory might produce more robust results (Brooks 1986; Agre and
Chapman 1987; Mataric 1992; Hendriks-Jansen 1996; Johnston and Brennan 1996). The implication for ontological evaluation
of information systems is that largely untested assumptions about the  appropriate design of purposeful systems lie at the heart
of many of the most engrained theories and practices in the information system discipline.
Information systems form a component of many management systems. We can focus on management systems and ask, how
influential are the two theories of intentionality outlined above for the design of management systems. Until recently the
deliberative approach has been dominant. The deliberative theory is very much our folk theory of agency and informs management
theories that place a high value on planning and which subsequently become embodied in information systems. A good example
is Manufacturing Resource Planning (MRP II) (Orlicky 1975; Wight 1981). MRP II is a manufacturing management philosophy
to which many software developments and packages have been addressed.  MRP II embodies the planning model in a very literal
way (Johnston 1995; Johnston and Brennan 1996). A computerised master production schedule represents the company-wide
production goal. This is processed against a product structure database that describes how raw materials and bought components
can be converted into the required saleable items. The current availability of these items is checked against an inventory database
and, by purely deductive means, schedules for buying and assembling parts to meet the master schedule are produced and handed
to operators for execution. The role of the various inventory and product structure databases in MRP II is to provide a mirror
image (object/symbol representation) of the real world in the abstract space of computer memory so that the computational and
analytic power of the computer can be used to deduce what to do. In effect, MRP II is an attempt to deal with the world “at arms
length” by making use of a model world.
Such a strong action selecting role for computer systems is now not fashionable. For instance, it is  not emphasised so strongly
in Enterprise Resource Planning systems that are the descendents of MRP II. However, the deliberative approach is strongly
present in the sociotechnical whole of which more passive database information systems are a component. That is, the data in
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information systems is meant to be used by humans for deliberative decision-making and subsequent action planning in much
the same way that MRP II attempted to automate. Treating these human decision makers as a component of the sociotechnical
agent together with the information system makes the similarity to the deliberative model apparent. 
The sociotechnical systems described in the previous paragraph make use of computing machines as an “analytical engine” which
manipulates vast quantities of objective data in order to recommend and even monitor actions. The information systems are
designed accordingly. In recent times the role of computers in human affairs has begun to be conceived more as a medium of
communication. Although the case is probably harder to establish, we would expect situational theories of agency to be more
influential in systems designed on this metaphor, particularly where the systems are designed to support  routine, collaborative
action, centred upon unstructured problem settings. Groupware, used in Computer-Supported Collaborative Work is an example.
In the seminal work on groupware by Winograd and Flores (1986), the influence of phenomenological philosophy, which is based
on an agent-centred ontology, was very clear and explicit.  If this assertion is correct we would expect groupware tools such as
Lotus Notes to be difficult to characterise in terms of objectivist ontologies and to embody constructs more easily associated with
subjective, agent-centred ontologies. This is a matter for empirical research. 
Conclusion
In this paper we have argued the proposition that information systems should be evaluated against ontologies which are consistent
with the ontological and representational commitments of the theory of intentionality which informs the design of the sociotechical
systems of which they are a component. The argument may be summarised as follows:
• Information systems should be studied as part of the larger sociotechnical system which is designed to do something
• It is then compelling and useful to conceive of this broader system as an intentional agent, and of the design of information
systems as part of a process of designing an intention agent.
• Design of intentional agents involves a commitment to a theory of intentionality, either explicitly or implicitly
• Theories of intentionality take the position that the agent acts through sensing, representation, action selections and action
execution
• There are two main theories of intentionality and they differ significantly in their ontological basis and requirements for
representation of the world of action
• Information system can be identified with the representational scheme of the broader intentional agent of which they are a
component
• This suggests that the expressive power of information systems  and tools should be judged against ontologies appropriate
to the theory of intentionality informing the design of the broader sociotechnical system in which they are used
• Failure to do so could limit the predictive power of ontological analysis either because the ontology used was inappropriate
to the commitments of the design approach of the broader system, or the design approach of the broader system was not
appropriate to the problem context. 
That many management systems which use information systems are informed by the deliberative theory of intentionality can be
seen by a step-by-step mapping of their components and assumption onto our outline of that theory. There are reasons to believe
also that some sociotechnical intentional systems currently existing could be better viewed as informed by the situational
approach, for example systems for collaboration using groupware, and that other systems supporting routine action and rich
communications might be better implemented through this metaphor. A detailed mapping of these systems onto the situational
model has not yet been undertaken. This is the subject of ongoing work.
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